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PRETEXTS 
by 
PANU M INKKINEN * 
There is nothing else of interest than that which happens in itself and is, thus, 
not of a narrative nature. One cannot recount i . 
Marguerite Duras 
The rgcit 
Marguerite Duras, an author, gives me the pretext o develop some 
notes concerning what could be called the aporia of law. Another French 
author, Maurice Blanchot, touches upon the subject in a short book, La 
communautd inavouable, 1which has during the past few years become one 
of the best known social and political texts within contemporary French 
philosophy. The latter of the book's two essays, "La communautd  des 
amants", is Blanchot's reading of Duras' short prose text La maladie de la 
mort .2 When l i terature encounters the political, one should, perhaps, 
examine the degree to which Duras is a pretext for Blanchot o continue a
discourse on love, fr iendship,  and community,  themes which have 
previously been dealt with especially in the collection L'amitid. In the 
closing pages of this  collection, we f ind B lanchot 's  often cited 
characterisation f friendship: 
Friendship, this relation without dependence, without episode and into which 
all the simplicity of life nevertheless enters, passes by way of the recognition of
the common strangeness that does not permit us to speak of our friends, but 
only to speak to them, not to make them a theme of conversations (orarticles), 
but the movement oflistening in which, speaking to us, they reserve, even in 
* Researcher, University of Helsinki, Finland. 
1 M. Blanchot, La Communautd Inavouable (Paris: Minuit, 1983), hereafter cited 
in the text as C/. 
2 Marguerite Duras, La Maladie de la Mort (Paris: Minuit, 1982), hereafter cited 
in the text as MM. 
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the greatest familiarity, the infinite distance, the fundamental separation 
from which that which separates becomes relation, s 
Strangeness,  distance, separation. Blanchot's f r iendship is incommensu-  
rabil ity, fr iendship that  exists only in separation. 
In his book, Blanchot also speaks of his re lat ion to Duras '  text  with 
express ions that  resonate  with fr iendship.  He notes that  his essay  
consists of observat ions that  "accompany" the read ing of Duras '  text. 
Blanchot's company, however, is not without ambiguity.  Duras '  text, the 
rdcit that  Blanchot wishes to accompany, is character ised by a certa in 
completeness: it is "in i tself  sufficient", "perfect", "without a way out" (CI 
51). But later  Blanchot refers to Duras'  "declarative text" as being merely 
apparent ly  a rdcit (CI 59). Blanchot says that  he is try ing to extract  he 
secret of the rdcit by turning the text around (CI 81) but, in doing so, must  
also "betray" the text (CI  83). What  is Duras '  mystery,  the secret of the 
rdcit that  requires Blanchot's betrayal? 
The Woman 
This is the social quest ion that  Blanchot is asking: What  are the 
conditions of community? The answer is sought from the relat ion between 
a woman and a man in Duras'  text. The lethal  disease indicated by the 
name of the novel is the man's  inabi l i ty  to love. According to Blanchot, 
the moral  or physical  evil of the disease cannot, however, be appointed to 
a subject.  I t  concerns the other 's  suffer ing, a suf fer ing which is 
incomprehensible and, yet, demands an answer (CI  59). 
At  f irst,  the symptoms of the d isease seem to be fa i r ly  easy to 
decipher. In the rdcit, a man who knows only those l ike h imsel f  enters  
into a contractual  re lat ion with an unknown woman. Address ing  the 
man, the narrator  of the r~cit gives us a motive: 
You tell her that you would like to try, try for several days perhaps. / Perhaps 
for several weeks. / Perhaps even for your whole life. / She asks: Try what? /
You say: To love (MM 8-9). 
The diagnosis or the verdict seems clear enough. Being unable to love, the 
man can approach the woman only by s t ipu la t ing  the terms of the i r  
relat ion in a contract binding both parties. On the other hand, the woman 
commits herse l f  to a re lat ion in which she appears  to be sur render ing  
hersel f  completely to the sexual desires of the man but, in real i ty,  reta ins 
3 M. Blanchot, L'Amitid (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 328. 
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a certain l iberty that is beyond the terms of the contract. Only spurious 
love, then, based on commerce, a relation that  could no more furnish the 
foundation for fr iendship than community. The sick man's  inabi l i ty to 
love is not, however, sexual. He even satisfies the woman but  cannot 
recognise the signs of a life al ien to him and, therefore, annu ls  the 
pleasure. This is his "malady of death" (CI 60-62). 
Blanchot asserts, however, that  we cannot reduce the rdcit to our 
pre l iminary  diagnosis (CI 62-65). The mystery that  escapes a facile 
reading of the text has to be searched for in the woman whose existence 
transcends the reality of the rdcit: she is more than Dasein. In a certain 
sense, only the woman is in the rdcit, the narrator  gives us nothing but 
her: 
She is very thin, almost slender, the beauty of her legs is of a different kind 
than that of the body. They are not properly implanted into the rest of the 
body (MM 21). 
The man attempts to see the beauty but, being unable  to recognise 
anyth ing but his own kind, he cannot. The woman is also the man's first 
and, according to Blanchot, the first woman for everyone: 
The body would have been long, made in a single casting, with a single stroke, 
as if by God himself, with the indelible perfection of individual coincidence 
(MM 20). 
The narrator  does not name the woman that  no name could possibly 
describe. She is God's creation but without nominal  existence. She is also 
fragile, and such weakness arouses in the man deadly desires: 
The body has no defences at all, it is smooth from the face to the feet. It 
entices trangulation, rape, maltreatments, insults, cries of hatred, the rage of 
austere, lethal passions (MM 21). 
But the man perceives the fragility of the woman as an unforeseen power: 
You look at this figure, at the same time you discover its infernal power, its 
abominable fragility, its weakness, the invincible force of its unparalleled 
weakness (MM 31). 
Lastly, the woman sleeps pract ical ly all the time. Because of her  
continuous sleep, her being sways in a familiar game: there, not-there. 
She sleeps. You do not wake her. The anxiety grows in the room at the same 
time as her sleep expands (MM 17). 
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The Other 
According to Blanchot, the woman acquires her enigmatic haracter  
from the peculiar closeness with which she offers herself  to the man. The 
man must  confront the difference of another species, of the absolutely 
other. The malady of death is, then, not only the man's inabi l i ty  to 
recognise the other. The il lness germinates in the absolute otherness of 
the woman (CI 65): 
You only know the grace of the bodies of the dead, the grace of those like you. 
All of a sudden you realise the difference between this grace of the bodies of 
the dead and the grace found here made of the utmost weakness that a mere 
gesture could crush, this royalty. / You discover that it is here, in her, that the 
malady of death is fomenting, that it is this displayed figure before you that 
decrees the malady of death (MM 37-38). 
The man tormented by his disease attempts continuously to love, to detect 
in the woman a recognisable and common simi lar i ty that  he seems to 
regard as the precondition of love. But his attempts are all in vain and, 
therefore, he weeps. The woman sees only self-pity in the tears that  he 
sheds,  but  the nar ra tor  reads from them the f i rst  and or ig ina l  
commandment of ethics: "Do not kill". 
You think you cry because you cannot love. You cry because you cannot 
impose death (MM 48). 
Blanchot indicates that  the asymmetr ical  difference between the unable 
man and the woman acting as love's chosen emissary points to an ethical 
relation. Blanchot's ethics is - following Emmanue l  L~v inas -  a non- 
reciprocal relat ion in which the other is always granted a place closer to 
God. Blanchot extracts an ethics from the following passage in Duras '  
text: 
You ask how the emotion of loving could come about. She answers you: 
Perhaps from a sudden flaw in the logic of the universe. She says: For 
example from an error. She says: never from a will (MM 52). 
From homogeneity required by understanding arises heterogeneity,  the 
abso lute ly  other  that  cannot be wanted  or desired. Love is the 
incommensurabi l i ty between the subject and the absolutely other. That  is 
why the man's  efforts at love, his at tempts  to detect in the woman a 
recognisable semblance, are doomed to fail. The woman's answer on the 
possibility of love continues: 
She says: From everything, from the flight of a night bird, from a sleep, from a 
sleeping dream, from the approach of death ... (MM 52). 
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The ambiguity  of death: as a disease the inabi l i ty to love, the inabi l i ty  to 
recognise the other, but, at the same time, also the movement of love i tse l f  
in which the unrecognisable other ar ises in its absolute otherness (CI 67- 
70). Therefore, true love can take place only in the mode of loss. One day, 
after the contract has expired, the woman has disappeared. At f irst, the 
man searches for her everywhere but: 
Very soon you give up, you do not look for her any more, not in the town, 
neither in the night, nor in the day. / Even so this way you have managed to 
live this love in the only way you could, by losing it before it came to be (MM 
57). 
The man does not live in the same t ime as the woman. He has not lost a 
woman that  he would once have had as his own. The d isappearance of the 
woman is the perfection of love i tsel f  that  has not yet begun and has, by 
the same token, a l ready ceased to exist. According to Blanchot, the f i rst  
words of ethics are spoken in this impossible love. The suffer ing of the 
other places her  above all  that  is existent.  Confront ing the abso lute  
otherness of the woman, the man is put  into question, and the only 
poss ib le  response  to the quest ion  of o therness  is the  l im i t less  
respons ib i l i ty  that  exceeds i tse l f  without,  however, exhaust ing  itself .  
Such a responsibi l i ty cannot be reduced to the Law but, to the contrary,  
precedes all  Law. Nevertheless,  i t is precisely the Law that  obl iges a 
response. The l imit less responsib i l i ty  towards the other is the s ingu lar  
exception to the universa l ly  b ind ing Law, an exception that  cannot  be 
art iculated in the formal language of the jur idical  (CI  71-73). 
The aporia of Law? 
The Friend 
Blanchot's hort book continues his social and political th ink ing which 
is deeply inspired by Georges Batai l le.  Through Batai l le,  the book takes  
part  in the so-called iscourse of"community". The first essay of the book, 
"La communaut~ n~gative", is Blanchot's reply to Jean-Luc Nancy's  text  
"La communaut~ d6sceuvr~e", an essay later  publ ished as the opening text 
of the book of the same name. 4
A third important  contribution to this discussion is Jacques Derr ida 's  
Politiques de l'amitid, publ ished a decade later.  Derr ida indicates that  
both Nancy and Blanchot have been notable sources of inspirat ion for the 
4 J-L. Nancy, La Communautd Ddsverde (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986/1990). 
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book, ~ but  the themes through which Der r ida  takes  his ana lys is  of 
f r iendsh ip - -  ethics, the other, respons ib i l i ty - -  seem to be closer to 
Blanchot than Nancy. Nancy's polit ical th ink ing  has since taken on a 
determinedly  Heideggerian bent. 
In a s l ight ly  di f ferent tone, Derr ida  repeats  the quest ion a l ready  
encountered in Blanchot: Who is the friend? What  is fr iendship? Derr ida 
f inds that  the phi losophies  of f r iendsh ip  have t rad i t iona l ly  been 
ar t i cu la ted  with the help of a d ist inct ion between true and apparent  
f r iendship.  Common fr iendship,  f r iendsh ip  here and now, does not 
measure  up to the requirements of true fr iendship. Therefore, fr iendship 
is never what  it seems, true fr iendship is never present. Blanchot's notion 
of community seems to re i terate the distinction: 
Which is, indeed, one of the traits of community, when that community 
dissolves itself, giving the impression that it could never have been, even when 
it had been (C/88). 
As f r iendsh ip  here and now cannot  fulfi l the requ i rements  of t rue 
f r iendship,  the la t te r  is postponed or de layed into the future with a 
promise.  The promise of a coming (true) f r iendship  also enta i ls  the 
obl igation to part ic ipate in its real isat ion.  One can prepare the way for 
the Messiah by studying the Torah; according to Derr ida, the discourse of 
f r iendship also takes place in the mode of prayer.  It is a request, a plea, 
or an appeal  (appel) that  is not addressed to the present  but, rather,  to a 
responsibi l i ty  opening into the future. But in the prayer,  one must  also 
address the past: for the appeal to be heard,  it must  carry within itself  the 
s igns of a min imum fr iendship,  a recol lection (rappel) of a f r iendship 
preceding all  other  fr iendships,  a being-together  that  is anter ior  to all 
speech - -  be it an acknowledgement of fr iendship or a declaration of war. 6 
B lanchot  also formulates the obl iging appea l  of the "unavowable 
community" as a responsibil ity: 
... it does not permit us to lose interest in the present ime which, by opening 
up unknown spaces of freedom, makes us responsible for new relations, always 
threatened, always hoped for ... (C/93). 
According to Derr ida,  the movement  and the t ime of f r iendship is the 
futur antdrieur in which the making present of the future and past  traces 
of f r iendship implies their  concurrent repudiat ion.  7 If fr iendship does not 
5 J. Derrida, Politiques de l'Amitid (Paris: Galilee, 1994), 56 n.1. 
6 Derrida, supra n.5, at 260-264. 
7 Derrida, supra n.5, at 279-280. 
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exist in the present, if it cannot be made present but must always be 
delayed into the future, how is one to understand the responsibility that is 
necessarily associated with friendship? How is one to understand ethics 
in a friendship that will never be present? 
For both Blanchot and Derrida, responsibility correlates with 
understanding or listening (entendre) and with answering or responding 
(rdpondre). Derrida maintains that answering is, firstly, answering for 
oneself in as much as a thing or a happening bears a proper name when 
one answers "in one's name". But a response is also forwarded to an 
other. Of these two modes of responding, answering to an other is more 
original because, when answering for oneself, the response is necessarily 
addressed to an other. Lastly, answering takes place before an other, but 
in this case it is a universal and institutional representative (the law, the 
tribunal, etc.) of a singular other. According to Derrida, the ability to 
answer for oneself is understood as responsibility which is associated with 
time, voice, and listening. Answering to and before the other is, on the 
other hand, identified with space, regard, and distance. This, in the 
Occidental philosophies of friendship, is usually understood as the 
distinctive character separating friendship from love. s
Derrida claims that the ethics of friendship ertaining to the ideals of 
the Enlightenment can be located at the intersection of responsibility and 
respect. It is a brotherly responsibility before reason in which the latter 
furnishes equality with a compelling character. In this scheme built 
around familial relations, friendship is absolute respect and responsibility 
amongst brethren before the father representing reason. The relation 
between father and sons is, on the other hand, characterised by a 
reciprocal but unequal love. 
In an ethics of friendship thus formulated, the other maintains its 
absolute singularity in principle, but the relation to the other is 
determined through the universality of the Law. According to Derrida, 
the discourse of universality refers to a third that oversees the face-to-face 
encounter of two absolutely singular beings. It seems, then, that we have 
two models of friendship. The first pertains to narcissism, the second to 
desire. 
In narcissistic friendship, the subject recognises in the friend a 
semblable, an other ego. In the dual relation, the Law operating as the 
third obliges the retention of a respectable distance required by friendship 
and, thus, prevents the two absolutely singular beings from plunging into 
8 Derrida, supra n.5, at 280-283. 
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the destructive abyss of narcissism. In friendship as desire - -  for Derrida, 
Blanchot seems to represent this mode l -  the other intervenes in the 
relation between the subject and the ego. But Derrida argues that even in 
desire a third Law, originating in the singularity of the other, commands 
the recognition of the t ranscendenta l  otherness of the other. But even 
such a transcendental  otherness requires the Law, the command of which 
furnishes the foundation for the recognition of otherness. 9 
The aporia of Law? 
The Law 
I would, finally, like to touch upon the st ructur ing of the rapport  
between the subject, the ego, and the other in relation to the Law from the 
position of the narrator  in La maladie de la mort.  In an earl ier text, 
Blanchot states that  the neuter  narrator  (i l) is the third person that, 
nonetheless, does not have the position of a subject. In the neuter space of 
the rdcit, the nar rat ive  voice destroys the possibi l i ty of re lat ions 
determined through a subject-object relation; the acting subjects of the 
rdcit lose their abil ity to say "I" (je). In the narrat ive voice, the other 
understood as the neuter  imposes itself into the rdcit in its irreducible 
strangeness and deceitful perversity: "The other speaks". 10 
The narrator of La maladie de la mort may not, however, be a voice in 
which only the other speaks. Its tone of voice is imperative rather  than  
majestic: 
You would not know anything either, never, neither you nor anybody, about 
how she thinks of the world or you, about your body or your soul, or about he 
disease that she says you have caught ( MM 19). 
Perhaps the specific nature of the narrator  is the reason why Blanchot 
regards Duras'  "declarative text" as only apparent ly  a rdcit. Blanchot 
hears something odlike in the imperative voice: 
Everything is decided by an initial "You" that is more than authoritative, that 
demands and determines what will happen or what could happen to one who 
has fallen into the snare of an inexorable fate. For the sake of ease, we will 
say that it is the "you" of the stage director giving indications to the actor who 
must make the passing figure he is to incarnate appear from nothing. So be it, 
but it must be, then, understood as the supreme Director: the biblical "You" 
9 Derrida, supra n.5, at 306-308. 
10 M. Blanchot, "La Voix Narrative", in L'Entretien Infini (Paris: Gallimard, 
1969), 556-567, at 563-565. 
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that comes from high above and prophetically fLxes the major traits of the plot 
in which we proceed, ignorant of what has been prescribed for us (CI 59). 
The authoritative voice directing the confrontation of the woman and the 
man operates like the Law. Firstly, it localises the rdcit in a room by the 
sea where the contract is put into effect. But the narrator  also orders the 
relation between the woman and the man into a hierarchy by empowering 
the woman to make the original diagnosis and, later, a discouraging 
prognosis of the man's illness: 
You ask her if she thinks you can be loved. / She says that you cannot in any 
circumstances ( MM 46). 
Blanchot hears the voice of the woman from as far away as the narrator's:  
A response so categorical that it cannot come from an ordinary mouth, but 
from very high above and very far away, a higher instance that also expresses 
itself in him with partial and trivial truths ((~ 90). 
The narrator - -  perhaps the Law - -  posits the other to address the subject 
"from very high above and very far away", from the posit ion of the 
supreme authority from which the '%iblical You"  also animates the plot. 
At the end of the rdcit, Duras - -  perhaps the director even superior to the 
supreme - -  has included irections on how the text should be set on stage. 
In these notes, Duras, however, inval idates the force of the Law. On 
stage, there would only be the woman and a male narrator,  only the other 
in its absolute strangeness and the Law. With speech- -  perhaps a 
jurisdiction - -  the narrator localises and orders the confrontation between 
the woman and the man, but: 
The man reading the story would be struck by an essential and mortal 
weakness that would be the weakness of the other man- -  the one not 
represented (MM 60). 
Pretext, both that which precedes the text and a preceding text. Not only 
the relation to the absolutely other that precedes responsibil ity prescribed 
by the Law, but also the Law itself, a prescription that  becomes the 
covenant of a friendship founded on pretext. 
The aporia of Law. 
